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NO. 46889-2019
ADA COUNTY NO. CR0l-17-44279

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Smith appeals from the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction. He asserts
the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction because his performance
on his rider was as close to perfect as is humanly possible. Executing Mr. Smith's sentence and
sending him to prison after such a performance was a waste of resources, contrary to public
policy, and clearly illustrated that the district court did not act consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and failed to reach its decision through
an exercise of reason.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In May of 2018, Mr. Smith pled guilty to one count of attempted injury to children.
(R.,p.16; Tr., p.17, Ls.8-11.) Mr. Smith admitted that he purchased alcohol and put it in the
trunk of his girlfriend's car, but his girlfriend's daughter knew about it, took it from the car, and
drank it with a friend who drank so much she got alcohol poisoning. (Tr., p.16, Ls.7-14, p.34,
Ls.12-21.)

The district court imposed a sentence of five years, with three years fixed, but

retained jurisdiction so Mr. Smith could participate in a rider program. 1 (R., p.17; Tr., p.53, L.25
- p.54, L.3.) The court said the rider was for "evaluative purposes at this point," and it wanted
Mr. Smith to have "additional programming," and take "Thinking for Change" and "substance
abuse treatment." (Tr., p.54, Ls.7-20.) It said it did "not in any way intend to communicate that"
it would place Mr. Smith back in the community even if his rider was successful. (Tr., p.54,
Ls.3-6.) Despite the court's warnings, Mr. Smith completed his rider "with great success" in
February of 2019, and the Idaho Department of Correction recommended that he be placed on
probation. (APSI, pp. I, 4.) 2
At the rider review hearing, the State admitted that Mr. Smith did a "good" rider but
recommended that the district court execute Mr. Smith's underlying sentence because of his prior
record. (Tr., p.61, L.9 - p.66, L.3.) Quoting LC.§ 19-2521, it said that there was "an undue risk
that during the period of suspended sentence or probation the defendant will commit another
crime." (Tr., p.64, Ls.16-21.) And it then proclaimed, based on Mr. Smith's prior record only,
that "This will absolutely occur." (Tr., p.64, Ls.21-25.)

1

The sentence in the original judgment of conviction was five years, with two years fixed, but
the district court issued an amended judgment of conviction to correct a clerical error after the
rider review hearing. (Tr., p.74, L.5 - p.75. L.14; R., pp.16-17.)
2
All citations to the APSI refer to the 15-page electronic document.
2

By contrast, Mr. Smith's attorney focused on the remarkable progress Mr. Smith had
made in the prior six months. He said he did not feel it was appropriate for the State to use
Mr. Smith's prior record to "invalidate" his performance on the rider because the reason the rider
program exists is that "we believe people will change." (Tr., p.66, L.10 - p.67, L.3.) And he
went on to explain that Mr. Smith's rider was not simply good, it was "perfect." (Tr., p.67,
Ls.15-20.) He recounted that Mr. Smith was described by the IDOC staff as a "class leader" who
would come to his classes with "detailed work." (Tr., p.67, Ls.21-25.) He also pointed out that
the APSI made it clear that Mr. Smith had talked at length about the underlying crime in this
case, and the fact that he was remorseful and acknowledged he should have done things
differently. (Tr., p.68, Ls.4-11.) Additionally, he spoke about how Mr. Smith regularly helped a
disabled man get to class on time. (Tr., p.68, L.1 - p.69, L.3.) He said that Mr. Smith had done
everything the court asked him to do, and he asked the court to place him on probation and
reduce his sentence based on his "exemplary performance on the rider." (Tr., p. 70, Ls.5-12.)
The district court then said, "Sir, when I placed you on the rider I specifically stated that .
. . the rider was for evaluative purposes only indicating that even if you had a very good rider,
the Court was free to impose your sentence based on considering all of the factors that the Court
must consider." (Tr., p.72, Ls.6-11.) And then, after acknowledging that Mr. Smith did indeed
do a "very good rider," in which he helped others and had "minimal disciplinary issues," it said it
was going to relinquish jurisdiction anyway "based on a review" of Mr. Smith's prior record.
(Tr., p.72, L.22 - p.73, L.12.) However, "in consideration of how well" Mr. Smith did on the
rider, it reduced his fixed time by six months. (Tr., p.73, Ls.13-24.) Mr. Smith then filed a
notice of appeal timely from the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction and reducing
sentence. (R., pp.21-25.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction instead of placing
Mr. Smith on probation after he completed a virtually flawless rider?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Instead Of Placing
Mr. Smith On Probation After He Completed A Virtually Flawless Rider

A.

Introduction
The district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction. Mr. Smith's

rider was not only very good, it was spectacular by any measure, and it showed that he was not
only motivated to improve himself, but also the lives of those around him. This was reflected at
multiple points in the APSI. Despite all of these positive comments, however, the district court
relinquished its jurisdiction and sent Mr. Smith to prison. This decision devalued Mr. Smith's
remarkable efforts on the rider, and disregarded how those efforts demonstrated his rehabilitative
potential and suitability for probation. Indeed, the decision constituted a waste of the State's
resources because Mr. Smith worked on classes during his rider that he could have completed in
prison if the district court had decided ahead of time to execute his sentence regardless of his
rider performance.

The record clearly reflects that it had made that decision before it sent

Mr. Smith on the rider. Therefore, it should not have given Mr. Smith false hope that he might
be put on probation ifhe applied himself on the rider.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter of discretion for the court. State v.

Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288-89 (Ct. App. 2010). "Where the trial court has exercised its
discretion after careful consideration of relevant factual circumstances and principles of law,
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without arbitrary disregard for such facts and principles of justice, the reviewing court will not
disturb the action without a clear showing of abuse of discretion." Deford v. State, 105 Idaho
865, 868 (1983). In determining whether a court abused its discretion, the appellate court will
determine whether the trial court: "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

C.

The District Court Did Not Reach Its Decision To Relinquish Jurisdiction Through An
Exercise Of Reason, And It Did Not Act Consistently With The Legal Standards
Applicable To Its Decision
The purpose of retaining jurisdiction is to evaluate the offender's potential for

rehabilitation and suitability for probation.

State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 161 (2010);

State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911, 915 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The primary purpose of the

retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial court to gain additional information
regarding the defendant's rehabilitative potential and suitability for probation.").

This

precedent clearly illustrates that a district court should not retain jurisdiction if it has no intention
oflater engaging in a careful analysis of how a defendant's performance on a rider reflects on his
rehabilitative potential and suitability for probation. This would be a clear abuse of discretion
because it would not be consistent with applicable legal standards, and it would demonstrate an
arbitrary disregard for the facts regarding a defendant's performance on a rider. It would also
demonstrate an arbitrary disregard for the principles of justice.

Yet that is precisely what

happened here. The district court made it clear at the rider review hearing that it never had any
intention of placing Mr. Smith on probation when it sent him to do the rider. It said it sent him
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on the rider "for evaluative purposes only so that [he] could receive programming at the front
end of [his] incarceration period." (Tr., p.72, Ls.19-22.)
At the sentencing hearing, the district court warned Mr. Smith that it was making no
promises to put him on probation at the end of the rider, but it gave him false hope. It said it was
sending him on the rider "for evaluative purposes at this point. ... " (Tr., p.54, Ls. 7-8 ( emphasis
added).) And it said Mr. Smith needed to take "Thinking for a Change" and "substance abuse
treatment." (Tr., p.54, Ls.14-20.) Thus, understandably, Mr. Smith thought that ifhe did a great
rider, and he completed those classes successfully, he would at least have a chance at probation,
so he worked hard to show the district court that he actually had great potential for rehabilitation
and was clearly suited for probation. However, as he found out at the rider review hearing, he
never even had a chance at probation because this was never the district court's intention. Thus,
the rider was a waste of the State's resources. If Mr. Smith had struggled on the rider, the district
court certainly had the discretion to execute his sentence. However, his rider was anything but a
struggle.
First, it is clear that Mr. Smith had no significant disciplinary issues of any kind; he
received one verbal warning because an officer "perceived that [he] was being disrespectful."
(APSI, p.3.)

Nevertheless, the district court said he had "minimal disciplinary issues."

(Tr., p.73, L.1.) But one officer's perception of how Mr. Smith communicated with him on one
day, over the course of six months of incarceration, should not be characterized as a "disciplinary
issue." Moreover, Mr. Smith's overall performance on the rider demonstrated that the officer's
perception was likely mistaken. For example, his case manager wrote, "While attending his
classes at ISCI, Mr. Smith displayed no resistance and was willing to engage in the curriculum in
all of his assigned classes. He actively participated in group discussions, came to class with
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detailed practice work, asked questions as well as assisted others with their daily class tasks."
(APSI, p.3.) The manager also noted that Mr. Smith had "volunteered to assist and mentor a
struggling peer by demonstrating use of problem-solving skills," and he had worked "well within
his groups" and was "respectful of his peers and alternative ways of thinking." (APSI, p.3.) She
also wrote that Mr. Smith had shared his life stories and taken "accountability for his past crime
and negative behaviors; showing remorse." (APSI, p.3.)
Apropos of Mr. Smith's rehabilitative potential, the manager wrote, "Over time, he
learned to slow down and think through each of the skill steps, allowing him to brainstorm his
options and use problem solving skills. Mr. Smith chose to use his real-life situations to role
play, enabling him to think about healthier outcomes and practice the coping skills." (APSI,
p.3.) She also wrote, "Mr. Smith participated in his classes in a positive manner, completing
assignments on time, taking accountability, helping a struggling peer and keeping an open mind
to learning new skills." (APSI, p.3.)
Similarly, when Mr. Smith was asked about what he learned on the rider, he said, among
many other things, that he learned new strategies on how to cognitively approach situations.
(APSI, p.5 (emphasis added).) He also spoke at length about situations that are risky for him,
and how he plans to deal with them. (APSI, p.5.) He said he ''understands he will need to make
changes in order to be successful on probation, stating, "Boundary setting, process counseling,
grievance counseling, absolutely no drugs or alcohol, obey all of the rules and laws no matter
how big or small, complete aftercare, pay all restitution. I see that these are all factors of holding
myself accountable." (APSI, p.6.) With respect to the underlying offense in this case, he wrote,
"I held the responsibility with the trust of supervising someone else's children in keeping them
safe and out of harm's way. Looking back at what I could have done, I should have called 911
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first and foremost or drove them to the hospital. I wouldn't be in this situation that I'm in today
ifl would have acted more responsibly." (APSI, p.6.)
Mr. Smith's case manager also wrote that Mr. Smith not only completed the classes that
the district court said he needed to, but completed them "with great success."

(APSI, p.6

(emphasis added).) She wrote that "Mr. Smith was viewed as a leader in his classes ... he also
volunteered his time to work with other extraordinarily difficult clients by helping and tutoring
them with class material. Staff felt that Mr. Smith had an excellent command of class materials
and he was entrusted to serve in this capacity as a student tutor. His work with these clients was
greatly appreciated." (APSI, pp.6-7.) The C-Notes from Mr. Smith's Thinking for a Change
class in particular were extremely positive. In one of them, the instructor wrote, "Mr. Smith is
doing an excellent job in TFAC class." (APSI, p.11.) In another, the instructor wrote that
Mr. Smith had "done an excellent [job] in maintaining his assignments and attendance.
addition, he has assisted with another inmate in class who has some disabilities.

In

Without

Mr. Smith's consistent assistance this person would have had a difficult time completing the
course." (APSI, p.10 (emphasis added).) That same instructor commented later that Mr. Smith
had, "in conjunction with another inmate quickly responded" to defuse a situation where an
inmate "became extremely irate because he missed the graduation presentation by the Program
Manager." (APSI, p.9.) The instructor noted that Mr. Smith solved the problem by bringing the
manager back to give another presentation.

(APSI, p.9.)

This demonstrated not only

Mr. Smith's compassion for others, but also his ability to work effectively with others to solve
problems.
His case manager also emphasized the fact that Mr. Smith had "worked with a disabled
offender who resides in our Medical Annex (our "nursing home" of the facility) and helped him
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get to class on a daily basis." (APSI, p.7.) And even though Mr. Smith was clearly taking time
to help others, his efforts in his own classes were described as "exemplary."

(APSI, p.7.)

Notably-again with respect to his rehabilitative potential and suitability for probation-the case
manager wrote, "Mr. Smith has demonstrated good insight into the behavior(s) that brought him
to prison; he has accepted responsibility for his actions and shows remorse and understanding for
what he did.
differently."

He has shown that he recognizes what he could have and should have done
(APSI, p.7 (emphasis added).)

Finally, the case manager wrote, "We believe

Mr. Smith has demonstrated sound amenability to treatment as evidenced by completing all
required programming ... gaining an increased insight into his behaviors, his volunteerism and
hard work, and his efforts at applying the skills he has learned into his daily living while at ISCI.
We feel that Mr. Smith is a solid candidate for community supervision . . . . "

(APSI, p.7

(emphasis added).) She then recommended that the district court place Mr. Smith on probation.
(APSI, p.7.)
All of the case manager's comments reflect very positively on Mr. Smith's rehabilitative
potential and suitability for probation. But there is no indication the district court was genuinely
interested in those things.

The APSI makes it clear that Mr. Smith could likely have done

nothing more to increase his chances to be put on probation, but the record as a whole shows
there was actually nothing he could have done to avoid the district court ultimately executing his
sentence. Indeed, by refusing to entertain the possibility of putting Mr. Smith on probation, the
district court failed to act consistently with the legal standards applicable to its decision. Further,
the district court's decision to execute the sentence in the face of clear evidence that Mr. Smith
was ready to be placed on probation, and deserved probation, needlessly contributed to the
overcrowding ofldaho's prisons and was thus contrary to public policy.

9

The State, like the district court, focused on Mr. Smith's prior record. At one point, the
prosecutor said that many of Mr. Smith's prior convictions were "for violence and harming
people."

(Tr., p.65, L.23 - p.66, L. 1.)

As Mr. Smith's counsel pointed out, however,

Mr. Smith's behavior on the rider showed he had changed because he was attacked without
provocation when he started the rider, and he did not respond with violence. (Tr., p.69, Ls.6-25.)
If there is any situation in which a person's violent tendencies might come out, this would be it.

However, the staff at the prison said, "Inmate Smith showed great control both physically and
mentally during an altercation with another inmate. He was hit three or four times and did not
retaliate. Even after the event he did not react negatively. This was appreciated by staff, his
behavior was exemplary."

(APSI, p.15 (emphasis added).)

This, along with his other

commendable behavior and insights throughout the program, showed that any prior problems
Mr. Smith may have with self-control or responding to a situation with violence are no longer an
issue for him.
The district court did not adequately consider any of this. If it felt-at the time of
sentencing-that Mr. Smith's prior record demanded a prison sentence in this case, it should
have executed the sentence. The district court certainly has the discretion to determine, after the
completion of a rider, whether a defendant is ready for probation.

But it must make that

determination through an exercise of reason, not arbitrary action. The purpose of the retained
jurisdiction is to determine the offender's potential for rehabilitation and suitability for
probation, but the district court failed to make that determination at the review hearing. Instead,
it executed the sentence, not based on Mr. Smith's rider performance but on his prior record.
The Court of Appeals in Lutes held that
When the district court agrees to a plea agreement calling for retained jurisdiction,
we conclude, absent evidence to the contrary, that the only implied term one
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might reasonably infer is that the district court agrees to give genuine
consideration to the Department of Correction's recommendation made at the
conclusion of the retained jurisdiction period.
Lutes, 141 Idaho at 915 (emphasis added). In this case, the district court did not give "genuine

consideration" to the recommendation made by the Department of Corrections at the conclusion
of the period of retained jurisdiction. Rather, it focused on his prior record.

After briefly

summarizing the comments in the APSI, it said, "However, the Court finds that based on a
review of your record in total that there are still concerns to the Court regarding placement in the
community at this time.

And the Court has determined that it is appropriate to relinquish

jurisdiction in this case." (Tr., p.73, Ls.7-12.)
The district court did not adequately consider what Mr. Smith got out of the rider and
whether he was ready for probation.

In this manner, the district court acted with arbitrary

disregard for the facts and principles of justice. Mr. Smith did everything the Department of
Corrections asked of him on the rider and much more. He was ready for probation. He may
have had a significant prior record, but the rider very clearly showed that he had changed. That
is the conclusion the district court should have reached based on a sincere and genuine
evaluation of his progress. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished
jurisdiction because it failed to apply the applicable legal standard, and it failed to reach its
decision to relinquish jurisdiction through an exercise of reason.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Smith respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
relinquishing jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court.
DATED this 1st day ofNovember, 2019.

/ s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of November, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
RPA/eas
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